The Supreme Court of India, on November 20, 2025, answered the 16th presidential reference concerning the powers of governors and the president in granting assent to bills providing clarity on constitutional procedure, judicial limits, and the balance required to uphold cooperative federalism. A bench comprising Chief Justice of India B.R. Gavai, Justice Surya Kant, Justice Vikram Nath, Justice P.S. Narasimha, and Justice A.S. Chandurkar heard the matter. Drawing from a series of disputes between state governments and governors, as well as an unprecedented judicial interpretation of Articles 200 and 201, the five-judge Constitution Bench has articulated a detailed understanding of legislative assent while rejecting attempts to expand judicial authority in this domain.
The ruling acknowledges the need to prevent constitutional authorities from paralysing legislative process, while simultaneously preserving the structural boundaries outlined in the Constitution. The court characterised this as a ‘functional reference’, noting that the earlier Tamil Nadu governor ruling had created a ‘state of doubt’ and inconsistency with larger bench precedents, thereby requiring authoritative clarification. The bench also declined to answer questions 12 and 14 as irrelevant, and question 13 as too broad to be answered ‘comprehensively and definitively’.
Background of the Presidential Reference
The reference originated from a series of events involving delays by governors in granting assent to bills forwarded by the state legislatures. In several states, long periods of inaction prompted litigation, particularly in the context of Tamil Nadu. The presidential reference arose following an April 8, 2025 verdict in State of Tamil Nadu vs Governor of Tamil Nadu case from Tamil Nadu, where a two-judge bench had issued time-bound directives on how governors and the president must handle bills and invoking Article 142, declared that 10 bills passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly would be treated as having received ‘deemed assent’ due to extended gubernatorial inaction. The Tamil Nadu judgment had also held that actions of the governor and the president under Articles 200 and 201 were justiciable, which the reference sought to clarify.
Following this ruling, the President Droupadi Murmu invoked Article 143(1) to seek clarity from Supreme Court on whether constitutional courts could impose timelines for decision by the president or governors on bills and whether the concept of deemed assent could be employed by the judiciary.
In the presidential reference, the president placed 14 questions before the Supreme Court regarding the nature and limits of the powers exercised by governors and the president under Articles 200 and 201, including whether judicial timelines or ‘deemed assent’ were constitutionally permissible.
(To explore the detailed background of the 14 questions referred to the Supreme Court by the President, refer to: Presidential Reference of 14 Questions to the Supreme Court.)
The court upheld the maintainability of the reference, holding that an Article 143 reference may in appropriate cases, revisit or even overrule prior decision consistent with the principle recognised in The Special Courts Bill (1978).
This move was significant because it sought a judicial interpretation that would provide constitutional guidance to both the Union and the states at a time of increasing friction. The questions reflected concerns about whether judicial intervention could reshape the mechanism established for granting or withholding of assent and whether prolonged silence by governors could be corrected without violating constitutional architecture.
Cooperative Federalism and the Role of Governors
Central to the court’s reasoning is the principle of cooperative federalism, which requires constructive engagement between constitutional authorities. The court held that governors could not indefinitely sit on bills passed by state legislatures. It emphasised that the Constitution does not envision a situation where inaction could be used as a tool to block legislation.
Reaffirming the scheme of Articles 200 and 201, the bench stated that governors must engage in institutional dialogue with elected Houses. When doubts or concerns arise over a bill, the governor must return it to the legislature with comments or reserve it for the president’s consideration, rather than creating legislative deadlock through silence. This ensures that the governor functions as part of the constitutional structure rather than as an obstacle to the functioning of a democratically elected state government. The court clarified that a governor’s discretion under the Constitution could not be whittled down; however, its exercise must remain faithful to constitutional morality and federal balance.
The court rejected the union government’s position that the governor has four options on a bill, clarifying that the Constitution contemplates only three—granting assent, withholding and returning the bill, or reserving it for the president.
(For a more detailed examination of the Supreme Court interpretation of the governor’s authority to withhold assent, refer to: Governor’s Power to Withhold Assent to Bills: Supreme Court Verdict.)
It further departed from the Tamil Nadu judgment by holding that even after a bill is reconsidered and returned by the legislature, the governor may still choose to reserve it for the president rather than being compelled to grant assent. Relying on Nabam Rebia case, the court also reiterated that although the governor does possess discretion under Article 200, such discretion is constitutionally limited and cannot be exercised arbitrarily.
Limits of Judicial Power on Legislative Assent
A central issue before the Constitution Bench concerned the authority of courts to prescribe timelines for governors or the president. The bench unequivocally held that constitutional courts could not impose fixed timelines for granting or withholding assent. The constitution was deliberately drafted without rigid timeframes, preserving an elasticity that could not be overridden by judicial orders. Any attempt to impose deadlines would amount to rewriting the constitution and violate the separation of powers.
The court stressed that while Article 200 uses the phrase ‘as soon as possible’, this cannot be judicially converted into a mandatory time limit as the Tamil Nadu judgment had attempted to do by drawing analogies from unrelated contexts. The court held that the Tamil Nadu judgment wrongly relied on Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs Speaker, Manipur, Legislative Assembly (2020) case, since the speaker’s quasi-judicial functions cannot be compared to the governor’s constitutional role.
The court further rejected the notion that courts could grant ‘deemed assent’. It held that the idea of ‘deemed assent’ would require courts to act as substitutes for governors or the president, which is inconsistent with the Constitution’s distribution of powers. The bench noted that granting ‘deemed assent’ effectively removes the role of another constitutional authority, which could not be permitted. The bench emphasised that such judicial action would amount to taking over the decision-making functions of the governor or the president, thereby undermining the doctrine of separation of powers.
The court criticised the Tamil Nadu Bench for using Article 142 to ‘deem assent’ and held that Article 142 cannot be used to supplant constitutional provisions.
Reassessment of Judicial Directions in the Tamil Nadu Case
In assessing the earlier directions issued by the two-judge bench, the Constitution Bench held that prescribing mandatory timelines through the exercise of judicial powers under Article 142 was unconstitutional. The earlier order had set specific time periods within which governors and the president were required to decide on bills. It also treated certain bills as having received ‘deemed assent’. The bench declared such directions impermissible as they introduced procedures and consequences not contemplated by Articles 200 and 201. By doing so, the earlier judgment crossed into the domain of constitutional amendment rather than interpretation. The court added that reliance on home ministry circulars to impose timelines was improper, because executive circulars cannot transform into constitutional obligations through judicial interpretation.
The bench reaffirmed that the judiciary could not substitute itself for constitutional authorities in the decision-making process. It held that the Constitution sets out a specific route for dealing with bills and courts could not create parallel mechanisms that bypass legislative and executive roles. It called the Tamil Nadu directions a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach that ignored the varying nature and complexity of different bills.
Scope of Judicial Review and Constitutional Accountability
The judgment, while drawing firm boundaries around judicial authority, does not eliminate the possibility of judicial review. The court recognised that while it could not prescribe timelines or grant deemed assent, it could examine cases or prolonged delay or mala fide conduct. Courts retain power to issue limited directions aimed at ensuring constitutional accountability. Such directions, however, must be carefully calibrated and issued only in appropriate circumstances. The court held that not every delay or dispute warrants judicial intervention, and any such step must be grounded in the broader constitutional scheme.
The court clarified that judicial review is limited to compelling the governor to act in cases of prolonged, unexplained inaction, and cannot extend to reviewing the merits of assent, return, or reservation.
The ruling, therefore, preserves the ability of courts to prevent abuse of constitutional discretion while ensuring they do not intrude into the domain of decision-making that the Constitution assigns to governors and the president.
President’s Advisory Powers under Article 143
Another important question pertained to whether courts could direct the president to seek an advisory opinion under Article 143 on bills reserved for consideration under Article 201. The bench held that the decision to seek such an opinion lies solely with the president. While Article 143 empowers the president to seek the Supreme Court’s advice on questions of law or fact of public importance, this initiative could not be compelled by judicial direction. The bench disagreed with the earlier view that the president should be required to seek judicial opinion on constitutional questions relating to reserved bills. The court made it clear that neither the governor nor the courts could mandate the use of Article 143. Also, it clarified that a presidential decision under Article 201 is not subject to judicial review before a bill becomes law.
Preserving Constitutional Design and Federal Balance
The judgment reflects a careful effort to maintain equilibrium between constitutional authorities. It affirms that governors could not use inaction as a veto and that state legislatures must not be subjected to indefinite delays. At the same time, it underscores that courts could not create new doctrines or impose procedural requirements that the Constitution itself does not contain. The decision, thus, reinforces the separation of powers while ensuring that constitutional mechanisms function in a manner consistent with democratic governance.
By answering the presidential reference in this manner, the Supreme Court attempted to strike a balance between ensuring constitutional accountability and respecting the separation of powers. The Supreme Court has delineated a framework in which legislative processes could not be paralysed by indefinite delays and judicial interpretations do not expand into areas reserved for constitutional authorities.
It reaffirmed that governors are bound by the spirit of cooperative federalism and could not paralyse state legislation through indefinite delay. Simultaneously, it warned that judges could not re-write the constitutional script by fixing rigid timelines, inventing ‘deemed assent’ or commandeering the advisory powers of the president. The ruling upholds the spirit of cooperative federalism and discourages obstructionist practices. It clarifies that constitutional accountability may be ensured through judicial review, provided courts do not exceed their mandate.
It prevents governors form frustrating legislative agenda of elected governments through silence yet firmly rejects judicial attempts to replace or direct constitutional authorities in matters of assent.
Through this advisory opinion, the Supreme Court has provided important clarity on the relationship between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislature. It protects the integrity of Articles 200 and 201, preserves the constitutional role of governors and the president. Additionally, it upholds the central principles of cooperative federalism and constitutional morality.
The ruling serves as a guidepost for future interactions between state legislatures, Raj Bhavans, and Rashtrapati Bhavan, ensuring that the constitutional process functions within its intended boundaries while preventing misuse of arbitrary obstruction of legislative processes. It, therefore, strengthens constitutional governance by affirming both responsibility and restraint, ensuring that constitutional processes remain aligned with democratic principles and federal harmony.
Divergent Perspectives on the Advisory Opinion
The responses to the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion on the Presidential Reference reveal deep and sharply articulated divisions within the legal and political community. Former Supreme Court judge Justice Madan Lokur strongly criticised the advisory, describing it as “not well-thought out (and) could add to the confusion rather than sort out any problems … it is confusing and messy.” He warned that contradictory interpretations of the Court’s observations could “create a constitutional crisis,” particularly if governors either claim to be bound by judicially indicated timelines or disregard them entirely. Senior advocate Dushyant Dave, also a former President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, shared this assessment, stating that the advisory opinion would add to the confusion and reiterating that the court should not have entertained the Presidential Reference.
Political reactions were similarly varied. Biman Banerjee, Speaker of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly, argued that a bill “loses significance when it remains stuck without clarity,” expressing his personal view that a fixed timeline should be laid down for governors to clear bills. Communist Party of India (Marxist) general secretary M.A. Baby went further, calling the court’s response “deplorable and shocking.”
From within the legal fraternity, noted constitutional expert V. Sudhish Pai delivered a scathing critique, describing the advisory as “bristling with faulty propositions” that “cut into the vitals of our constitutional democracy”. His analysis contends that by carving out discretion under Article 200, the opinion risks creating “unelected parallel power centres” contrary to the principle of ministerial responsibility affirmed in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab. He also criticised the court for “logical and textual gymnastics” and for disregarding decades of constitutional evolution on standards of reasonableness. Senior advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi, who argued for state governments, similarly characterised the ruling as a “retreat from federalism,” pointing to the absence of clear criteria for determining “inordinate delays.” Opposition leader Jairam Ramesh termed it “a green light for constitutional sabotage”.
In contrast, several legal experts viewed the advisory as a measured correction. Senior advocate Vikas Pahwa described the ruling as a “corrective intervention,” noting that while it rolled back the three-month timelines imposed earlier, it continued to guard against “prolonged, unexplained and indefinite delays” and restored “a more balanced approach.” Senior advocate Amit Anand Tiwari affirmed that the ten Tamil Nadu bills which had received deemed assent under the April 8 judgment had already “become laws and have been notified,” and that the advisory opinion cannot overturn a final judgment. Supreme Court advocate Tushar Kumar welcomed the restoration of “elasticity” within Articles 200 and 201, emphasising that assent is “not a mechanical act to be standardised by the judiciary.” Legal practitioner Abhinay Sharma similarly noted that the ruling “tightens the governor’s options and blocks indefinite withholding of assent,” reaffirming federal balance. B. Shravanth Shanker, Advocate-on-Record, observed that although the advisory may be revisited in future adversarial cases, its per curiam format reflects “a collective voice” of the court in a politically sensitive matter.
Taken together, these reactions underscore the continuing tension between the need to prevent executive inaction that paralyses legislative intent and the imperative of maintaining judicial restraint in areas expressly left to constitutional functionaries. Whether the advisory ultimately strengthens cooperative federalism or reopens avenues for gubernatorial overreach will depend on how courts operationalise the notions of “prolonged,” “unexplained,” or “indefinite” delay—questions that remain unresolved and may resurface in future constitutional litigation.
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